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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CODY WILLIAM PARMER,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 43210
Kootenai County Case No.
CR-2010-6509

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Parmer failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his Rule 35 motion for reduction of his unified sentence of 16 years with six
years fixed, imposed upon his conviction for battery with the intent to commit a serious
felony, rape?

Parmer Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
Parmer was convicted after a jury trial of battery with the intent to commit rape,
and the district court imposed a unified sentence of 15 years, with six years fixed and
retained jurisdiction for 365 days. (R., pp.2-12, 23.) Parmer timely appealed from the
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district court’s order retaining jurisdiction and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed his
conviction. (R., pp.22-30.) While Parmer’s appeal was pending, the district court held a
jurisdictional review hearing, suspended Parmer’s sentence and placed him on
probation for five years. (R., pp.12-13.)
Parmer subsequently violated his probation, and the district court revoked
Parmer’s probation, ordered his underlying sentence executed, and retained jurisdiction
for a second time. (R., pp.13-16.) Parmer timely appealed from the district court’s order
revoking his probation and executing his underlying sentence without reduction. (R.,
p.16.)

The Idaho Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the district court’s order

revoking Parmer’s probation. (R., pp.74-76.) After Parmer’s second period of retained
jurisdiction, the district court suspended his sentence and placed Parmer back on
probation for three years. (R., pp.42-46.)
Approximately eight months later, Parmer admitted he had violated his probation
a second time.

(R., pp.111-12.)

The district court subsequently revoked Parmer’s

probation and ordered his underlying sentence executed without reduction. (R., pp.11314.) Parmer timely filed a Rule 35 motion for sentence reduction, which the district
court denied. (R., pp.115-16, 120-21, 141-42, 153-54.) Parmer timely appealed from
the district court’s denial of his Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.143-45.)
Parmer asserts the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35
motion in light of his young age, substance abuse issues, acceptance of responsibility,
and desire to be a father to his young son. (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-5.) There are two
reasons why Parmer’s argument fails. First, the district court lacked jurisdiction, 250
days after the entry of the order revoking probation, to consider Parmer’s Rule 35
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motion. Second, even if this Court reviews the merits of Parmer’s claims, he has failed
to establish an abuse of discretion in the denial of his Rule 35 request for leniency.
Rule 35 provides both that a motion for reduction may be made within 120 days
after judgment is entered and within 14 days after probation is revoked, and that a
district court may reduce a sentence within 120 days of judgment and within 14 days of
a probation revocation. I.C.R. 35. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a trial court
has jurisdiction to rule on a Rule 35 motion within a “reasonable time” after the
jurisdictional time limit expires. State v. Chapman, 121 Idaho 351, 352, 825 P.2d 74, 75
(1992). If, however, the trial court fails to rule upon the motion “within a reasonable time
after the expiration of the [time] period, the trial court loses jurisdiction.” Chapman, 121
Idaho at 354, 825 P.2d at 77; State v. Tranmer, 135 Idaho 614, 616, 21 P.3d 936, 938
(Ct. App. 2001). In addition, it is the movant’s responsibility to “precipitate action on the
motion within a reasonable time frame, or otherwise provide an adequate record and
justification for the delay.” State v. Day, 131 Idaho 184, 186, 953 P.2d 624, 626 (Ct. App.
1998). On appeal, the defendant bears the burden of showing in the record the reason
for, and the reasonableness of, any delay. Id.
The district court failed to rule on Parmer’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction of
sentence while it was vested with jurisdiction. The order revoking Parmer’s was entered
on July 16, 2014, and Parmer filed his Rule 35 motion 2 days later, on July 18, 2014.
(R., pp.113-16.)

On July 24, 2014, the district court entered a “Notice of Intent to

Dismiss Defendant’s I.C.R. 35 Motion for Failure to State a Basis for the Motion.” (R.,
pp.117-19.)

Parmer subsequently filed a pro se “Motion for I.C.R. 35 and Post

Conviction [sic] Relief” on August 7, 2014 and the district court set it for hearing. (R., pp.
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19, 120-22.) At the hearing, Parmer’s attorney requested additional time to allow him to
speak to Parmer, and the hearing was continued for 60 days. (R., p.122.) Per the
register of actions, the hearing was continued a second time at the request of the state.
(R., p. 19.) The hearing was then continued twice more before the district court verbally
denied Parmer’s motion on March 23, 2015. (R., pp.131, 136, 141.)
The district court had a “reasonable time” to rule on the motion, but did not rule on
the motion until 250 days after the entry of the order revoking Parmer’s probation, well
past the 14-day jurisdictional limit. (R., p.141.) Although there is some indication in the
record regarding the court’s reasons for not ruling on the motion within 14 days, nothing
in the record justifies the extension of the jurisdictional period for another 236 days.
Because the motion was not ruled on within the jurisdictional limit, and there was no
showing of necessity for ruling on the motion 236 days beyond the 14-day jurisdictional
limit, the court lost jurisdiction to consider the motion.

Because district court lost

jurisdiction, due to the passage of time, to rule on Parmer’s Rule 35 motion for a
reduction of sentence, its order denying the motion should be affirmed.
Even if this Court finds that the district court had jurisdiction to rule on the Rule
35 motion, Parmer has still failed to establish an abuse of discretion. If a sentence is
within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is a
plea for leniency, and this court reviews the denial of the motion for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). To
prevail on appeal, Parmer must “show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or
additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule
35 motion.” Id. Parmer has failed to satisfy his burden.
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The only “new” information Parmer provided in support of his Rule 35 motion was
his desire to be parole eligible at the same time as in an unrelated case, his young age
and desire to be a father to his son, as well as his desire for treatment for his substance
abuse issues. (R., pp.120-21.) This was not new information before the district court,
as Parmer’s young age, desire to be a better father to his son, and desire for additional
substance abuse treatment were all facts known to the district court at the time it
revoked Parmer’s probation. (07/09/2014 Tr., p.14, L.19 – p.19, L.5; PSI, pp.5-6, 8. 1)
The district court was also aware of Parmer’s desire to have the fixed portion of his
sentence in this case reduced so he would be eligible for parole at the same time that
he completed the fixed portion of his sentence in his other case. (07/09/2014 Tr., p.15,
Ls.14-18.)
At the hearing on his Rule 35 motion, Parmer acknowledged he was not
supporting his request for leniency with any new information, and when asked why the
district court should be lenient upon him, Parmer stated, “I don’t think they should be. I’m
just asking for the leniency.” (03/23/2015 Tr., p.6, L.11 – p.7, L.3.) Because Parmer
presented no new evidence in support of his Rule 35 motion, he failed to demonstrate in
the motion that his sentence was excessive. Having failed to make such a showing, he
has failed to establish any basis for reversal of the district court’s order denying his Rule
35 motion. Even if this Court addresses the merits of Parmer’s claim, the state submits
that by failing to establish that his sentence was excessive as imposed, Parmer has
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Citations to the PSI are to the electronic file “CR10-6509 PARMER #43210
SEALED.pdf.”
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also failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35
motion for a reduction of sentence.
Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order
denying Parmer’s Rule 35 motion.
DATED this 5th day of November, 2015.

/s/
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

CATHERINE MINYARD
Paralegal

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 5th day of November, 2015, served a true
and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic
copy to:
JENNY C. SWINFORD
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

/s/
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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